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Smyer and O'Gorman: Significant Recent Developments in Federal Consumer Credit Legisl

SIGNIFICANT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION
AND CASE LAW
JOE P. SMYER* AND P. KEITH O'GORMAN**

During the two year period from October, 1974 to October, 1976,
considerable amending legislation was passed by the United States

Congress that expanded existing federal consumer credit legislation.'
During this period, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Fair

Credit Billing Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Mortgage
Disclosure Act were passed by Congress to provide additional protection to the consumer in consumer credit transactions. During the same
period, the federal court of appeals rendered several decisions construing this consumer credit legislation.

An examination of this new legislation and these cases, with
particular emphasis on those decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, will assist in an understanding of their effects and the

legal requirements they impose on parties to consumer credit transactions.
RECENT AMENDMENTS

TO THE

CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION

ACT

Recent Amendments to FederalTruth-In-Lending Act
During the spring and summer of 1974 the United States Congress
worked on various amendments to the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act2
(TIL), a majority of which became effective on October 28, 1974.'
* B.A., M.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Member of Cox, Smith, Smith, Hale &
Guenther, Inc., San Antonio, Texas.
** B.A., Rice University; J.D., University of Texas. Member of Cox, Smith,
Smith, Hale & Guenther, Inc., San Antonio, Texas.
1. For the purpose of this article "consumer credit" may be generally defined as
credit which is extended to natural persons for personal, family, or household purposes.
For a detailed analysis of both federal and Texas legislation and case law concerning
consumer credit prior to 1974, see Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case
Law Concerning Consumer Credit (pts. 1 & 2), 6 ST. MARY's L.J. 37, 549 (1974).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1666 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title I1, 88 Stat. 1511 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975)).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 4, Art. 5

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:707

One of the most important TIL amendments is the authorization of
class actions for alleged violations of the Act.4 Previously, the TIL did
not specifically authorize class action suits for any alleged violation of
the Act. 5 The civil liability section of the Act was amended in October
1974 to allow class action suits and to allow a court to determine the
amount that each class member would receive in the event a class
action is successfully litigated. While no minimum recovery is applicable to each member of the class, the total recovery in such action
may not be more than the lesser of five hundred thousand dollars or
one percent of the net worth of the creditor." To determine the
amount of damages to be awarded a class, the amendment authorizes
the court to consider "the frequency, and persistence of failures of
compliance by the creditor, the resources of the creditor, the number
of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the creditor's
failure of compliance was intentional." 7
The civil liability section was also amended to allow a successful litigant recovery of any actual damages sustained by him as a result of the
creditor's failure to make disclosures required by the statute. Recovery
of actual damages is in addition to the statutory damages previously
authorized by the statute.'
A statutory defense in consumer credit litigation was also added by
amendment to the TIL. Good faith compliance with any rule, regulation, or interpretation of the Federal Reserve Board may be asserted
as a defense by a creditor involved in litigation.9 In addition, where
multiple failures to disclose are shown, the amendment limits liability
to a single recovery unless the failure is a continuing one after recovery
has been granted. 10
A time limit on the right of rescission in transactions involving liens
(other than first liens) in consumer real estate transactions is now statuA consumer's right of rescission shall expire three
torily imposed.'
years after the date of the transaction's consummation or upon the sale
of the property, whichever occurs first. 2 The right of rescission ex4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(Supp. V 1975).

5. Id.§ 1640(a) (1970) (amended 1974).
6. Id.§ 1640(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1975) (amended in 1976, increasing maximum
recovery from $100,000 to $500,000).
7. Id.§ 1640(a).
8. Id.§ 1640(a).
9. Id.§ 1640(f).
10. ld. § 1640(g).
11. Id.§ 1635(e), (f).
12. Id.§ 1635(f).
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pires regardless of whether disclosures required by the Act have been

delivered to the consumer. 3 A creditor must also disclose any security
14
interest that may arise by operation of state law.
FAIR CREDIT BILLING ACT

The 1974 amendments to the TIL also contain the Fair Credit Bill-

ing Act,' 5 the primary purpose of which is to protect consumers
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.' 8
The Act extends the definition of the term "creditor" to include credit
card issuers.' 7 Creditors are required to notify credit card holders

periodically of their rights concerning
billing errors which may appear
8
accounts.1
cardholders'
the
in
The Act also defines "billing error" and provides for a procedure to

correct alleged billing errors which might appear in the periodic statements of the cardholders' accounts. 19 Additionally, the Act provides
for a time framework in which a creditor must resolve any notice of
an alleged billing error. For example, if a creditor, within sixty days
after having transmitted an obligor's statement to the obligor, receives
a written notice from the obligor that sufficiently identifies an alleged
billing error, the creditor must send a written acknowledgment thereof
to the obligor not later than thirty days after the receipt of the notice,

20
unless the alleged error has been resolved.

13. Id. § 1635(f).
14. Id. § 1635(a). Another significant amendment provides for the exemption of
certain credit transactions primarily for agricultural purposes where the amount financed exceeds $25,000. Id. § 1603(5). Specific disclosure is required in advertisements where a finance charge is not imposed but a consumer is allowed to repay the
cost in more than four installments. Id. § 1665(a). Also, a civil action for violation
of the TIL may be brought against an assignee of the original credit transaction where
the violation is apparent on the face of the assigned instrument unless the assignment
is involuntary. Id. § 1614. Additional regulations concerning business credit cards and
the fraudulent use of credit cards are set out at Id. § 1644.
15. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title III, 88 Stat. 1511 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975)).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975); Littlefield, Federal Consumer Credit Legislation: Some New Developments (pts. 1 & 2), 80 CoM. L.J. 312, 349 (1975); Proxmire,
The FairCredit Billing Act, 6 U.C.C. L.J. 5 (1973).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (Supp.V 1975).
18. Id. § 1637(a)(8). The prescribed form of the notice is set out in 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.7(a)(9) (1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a), (b) (Supp. V 1975). Billing errors are defined to include
reflections on statements of credit extension either not made or not in the amount stated;
requests for clarifying the credit extension and appropriate evidence of such transaction;
situations where goods and services were not accepted or not delivered per agreement;
failure to indicate payments made or credits due on the account; computation or other
clerical errors; and any other error specified by Board regulations. Id. § 1666(b).
20. Id. § 1666(a). Within two billing cycles after receipt of the notice and prior
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In the event an obligor has filed a written notice of an alleged billing
error, a creditor may not restrict or close the account pending the creditor's examination of the alleged billing error.2 Further, a creditor is
prohibited from threatening to report to any person an obligor's failure
to pay the amount involved in an alleged billing error until the creditor
has complied with the required billing error review procedures.22
A significant part of the Act allows the cardholder to raise certain
of those defenses against the card issuer that the cardholder already
had against the seller.2" As a result, the card issuer is made subject
to,

all claims (other than tort claims) and defenses arising out of any
transaction in which the credit card is used as a method of payment or an extension of credit if (1) the obligor has made a good
faith attempt to obtain satisfactory resolution of a disagreement
or problem relative to the transaction from the person honoring
the credit cards; (2) the amount of the initial transaction exceeds
$50.00; and (3) the place where the initial transaction occurred
was in the same State as the mailing address previously provided
by the card holder or was within one hundred miles from such
address ....

24

The amount of claims or defenses asserted against the card issuer is
limited to the amount of credit outstanding with respect to the transaction at the time the cardholder first notifies the issuer of such claim
or defense.2 5 This provision of the Act actually constitutes a modified
repeal of the holder in due course doctrine where creditor transactions
are involved.
Cash discounts to credit cardholders of up to five percent of the merchandise price may no longer be prohibited by credit card issuers. 26
Additionally, setoffs of an obligor's credit card account against his
to the taking of any action to collect the disputed amount, the creditor must either (a)
make the appropriate corrections and notify the obligor of such corrections, or (b) send
a written explanation to the obligor after the creditor conducts an investigation of the
alleged billing error, stating why the creditor believes the account to be correctly shown
in the periodic statement. Id. § 1666(a).
21. id. § 1666(d).
22. Id. § 1666(a). The obligor is allowed a minimum of 10 days to make payment
as provided in the credit agreement. Id. The creditor must promptly credit payments
received from an obligor, and promptly account for any excess payments. Id. §§ 1666c,
1666d.
23. Id. § 1666i.
24. Id. § 1666i(a).
25. Id. § 1666i(b).
26. ld. § 1666f. Nor may merchants participating in a credit card plan be required to purchase tie-in services. Id. § 1666g.
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checking or savings account is prohibited unless the cardholder previously agreed in writing to allow the setoff. 7
CONSUMER LEASING ACT OF 1976
The Consumer Leasing Act of 1976 was passed as another amendment to the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act to become effective March
23, 1977. s Prior to its enactment, many sellers were leasing automobiles and other goods for consumer use without adequate cost disclosures. The purpose of the legislation, therefore, was to provide guide-

lines whereby consumers would receive meaningful disclosures concerning lease terms.29
In effectuating the Act's disclosure guidelines, the Federal Reserve

Board has proposed amendments to Regulation Z to become effective
on March 23, 1977.30 The pertinent provisions of Regulation Z will
require the lease to disclose a brief description of the leased property,
the total amount to be paid by the lessee, with all charges individually
itemized, and a statement identifying any express warranties available
to the lessee. 8 '
27.
28.
§ 1667
29.

Id.§ 1666h(a)(1).
Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
(Pamp. Supp II 1976)).
15 U.S.C.A. § 1601(b) (Pamp. Supp. 11 1976). "Consumer Lease" is defined

as:

a contract in the form of a lease or bailment for the use of personal property by
a natural person for a period of time exceeding four months, and for a total contractual obligation not exceeding $25,000, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not the lessee has the option to purchase or otherwise
become the owner of the property at the expiration of the lease .....
id. § 1667(1). The term does not include leases for agriculture, business, or commercial
purposes. Id. § 1667(1).
30. 41 Fed. Reg. 45,540 (1976).
31. Id. The regulation provides for the following disclosures:
(2) The total amount of any payment, . . . advance payment, ...
or any trade-in
allowance, . . . to be paid by the lessee at consummation of the lease.

(3) The number, amount and due date or periods of payments scheduled under
the lease and the total amount of such periodic payments.
(4) The total amount paid . . . for official fees, registration, certificate of title, license fees or taxes.
(5) The total amount of all other charges, individually itemized ....
(6) A brief identification of insurance in connection with the lease ....
(7) A statement identifying any express warranties or guarantees available to the
lessee made by the lessor or manufacturer with respect to the leased property.
(8) An identification of the party responsible for maintaining or servicing the
leased property together with a brief description of the responsibility, . . . .
(9) A description of any security interest, other than a security deposit . . . and a
clear identification of the property to which the security interest relates.
(10) The amount or method of determining the amount of any penalty or other
charge for delinquency, default or late payments.
(11)
A statement of whether or not the lessee has the option to purchase the
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In addition to these proposed amendments, the Federal Reserve
Board will apparently propose sample disclosure forms for use with
leases of personal property, which will help assure compliance with the
3 2
regulations.
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT

In addition to the amendments to the Truth-in-Lending Act cited
above, the Consumer Credit Protection Act was amended to include
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). The principal purpose
of the ECOA is to make it
unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant,
with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction (1) on the basis
of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or
age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract); (2)
leased property and, if at the end of the lease term, at which price, and, if prior
to the end of the lease term, at what time and the price or method of determining
the price.
(12) A statement of the conditions under which the lessee or lessor may terminate
the lease prior to the end of the lease term and the amount or method of determining the amount of any penalty or other charge for early termination.
(13) A statement that the lessee shall be liable for the difference between the estimated value of the property and its realized value at early termination or the end of
the lease term, if such liability exists.
(14) Where the lessee's liability at early termination or at the end of the lease
term is based on the estimated value of the leased property, a statement that the
lessee may obtain at the end of the lease term or at early termination, at the lessee's
expense, a professional appraisal of the value which could be realized at sale of
the leased property by an independent third party agreed to by the lessee and the
lessor, which appraisal shall be final and binding on the parties.
(15) Where the lessee's liability at the end of the lease term is based upon the
estimated value of the leased property:
(i) The value of the property at consummation of the lease, the itemized total
lease obligation at the end of the lease term, and the difference between them.
(ii) That there is a rebuttable presumption that the estimated value of the leased
property at the end of the lease is unreasonable and not in good faith to the
extent that it exceeds the realized value by more than three times the average
payment allocable to a monthly period, and that the lessor cannot collect
the amount of such excess liability unless the lessor brings a successful action in court in which the lessor pays the lessee's attorney's fees, and that this
provision regarding the presumption and attorney's fees does not apply to
the extent the excess of estimated value over realized value is due to unreasonable wear or use, or excessive use.
(iii) A statement that the requirements . . . [cited immediately above] do not
preclude the right of a willing lessee to make any mutual agreeable final
adjustment regarding such excess liability.
32. Letter, dated November 16, 1976 (Circular No. 76-146) from the Federal Reserve bank of Dallas to all banks, other creditors, and others concerned in the Eleventh
Federal Reserve District. The Act also regulates and restricts a lessor's advertising concerning consumer leases. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1667c (Pamp. Supp. II 1976). It subjects a
lessor who fails to comply with the various requirements of the Act to the damages generally available to a consumer under the Truth-In-Lending Act. Id. § 1667d(a).
Actions for alleged failure to comply with the requirements of the Act must be brought
within one year of the termination of the lease agreement. Id. § 1667d(c).
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because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any
public assistance program; or (3) because the applicant has in
good faith exercised any right under the Consumer Protection
Act.8"

The ECOA specifically prohibits discrimination against any credit
applicant on the basis of sex, marital status, or any other prohibited
basis as provided therein and specifies the federal agencies who are
charged with the enforcement of the Act."4 Section 1691e of the
ECOA specifies the penalties which a creditor must pay to a successful
aggrieved credit applicant for the creditor's failure to comply with any
of the provisions of the Act or the regulations which are implemented
to enforce it.8 5

An applicant who brings a suit in an individual

capacity and is awarded judgment may recover any actual damages sustained by the applicant and punitive damages in an amount not greater
than ten thousand dollars, as determined by the court.86 If a judgment
is awarded to an applicant in a class action suit, the applicant may recover any actual damages sustained, and the court may impose punitive
damages in an amount not to exceed the lesser of five hundred
thousand dollars or one percent of the net worth of the creditor.8 7
The ECOA, however, excuses the creditor for any act or omission
committed in good faith and in conformity with any Federal Reserve
Board rule, regulation, or interpretation."
Regulation B, as amended
March 23, 1977, divides credit into consumer credit, incidental credit,
business credit, securities credit, governmental credit, and public utilities
credit.89 Incidental credit, business credit, securities credit, governmental credit, and public utilities credit are exempted from certain of
the procedural provisions of the regulation. 40 The regulation does not
exempt, however, such credit from the basic prohibition of the ECOA
against discrimination in credit transactions.4"
33. As amended by Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, Title VII, § 701.
90 Stat. 251 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 (Pamp. Supp. II 1976)).
34. 15 U.S.C.A § 1691 (Pamp. Supp. I 1976). The statutory provisions are expanded in the appropriate provisions of Federal Reserve Board Regulation B, 12 C.F.R.
§ 202 (1977).
35. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e (Pamp. Supp. II 1976).
36. Id. § 1691e(a), (b).
37. Id. § 1691e(b). A successful litigant is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees as determined by the court. Id. § 1691e(d).
38. Id. § 1691e(e). This section also requires an action to be brought within two
years from the date of the occurrence of the violation. Id. § 1691e(e).
39. 12 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1977).
40. Id. § 202.3.
41. Id. § 202.3.
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Regulation B consists of thirteen sections which, among other things,
define the scope and definitions of the regulation and specify the information which shall and shall not be requested in credit applications.

The regulation also designates how credit information shall be furnished to consumer reporting agencies and other credit information recipients.42 The provisions of Regulation B also prohibit a creditor from
discriminating against an applicant on a prohibited basis.43 Creditors
may not refuse, on the prohibited basis provided in Regulation B, to
grant separate accounts to creditworthy applicants, nor may they discount the income (including part-time income) of an applicant or an applicant's spouse on any prohibited basis specified in the regulation.44
Creditors may no longer request information concerning birth control
practices or child bearing capability, nor may they consider any aggregate statistics or assumptions relating to the likelihood of any group of
persons bearing or rearing children.45

Regulation B further prohibits

the aggregation or combination of separate accounts of spouses for purposes of determining finance charges or loan ceilings permissible under
the laws of Texas or of the United States.46

In describing marital status, Regulation B requires that credit application forms contain only the terms "married," "unmarried," or "separated.

'47

If the application form requests that an applicant designate

42. Id. § 202.10. Limitations are also imposed on requests for the signature of
a spouse or other person concerning a credit transaction. Id. § 202.7.
43. Id. § 202.4 and § 202.3(2).
44. Id. § 202.5. Additionally, creditors cannot prohibit an applicant from using
a birth-given name and surname, or a birth-given first name and a combined surname.
Id. § 202.7(h).
45. Id. § 202.5(d).
46. Id. § 202.11(c). In addition, Regulation B requires that a creditor shall: consider alimony, child support, or maintenance payments as income where an applicant
chooses to disclose that income, to the extent that such payments are likely to be consistently made; notify the applicant of any adverse action taken upon the credit application and furnish each applicant the reasons for the denial of credit or the termination
of the account. Id. § 202.6(b)(5),. 9. Included in the section is a suggested form
a creditor may use for the statement of its reasons for denial or termination of credit.
Id. § 202.9(b)(2). As of March 23, 1977, each creditor is to retain as to each credit
applicant, in original form or copy thereof, any application form and the documents designated in § 202.12 for a period ending 25 months after the date the creditor gives the
applicant notice of its action on an application, or after the date the creditor adversely
changes the terms or conditions of credit for an account. In the event any creditor
is notified it is under investigation for violation of Regulation B by the appropriate
investigatory agency, or if it has been served with notice of an action filed against
it, the creditor shall retain the information required in subsections (1) and (2) of
202.12(b) until final disposition of the matter or as ordered by the agency or court. Id.
§ 202.12.
47. Id. § 202.5(d). "Marital status" is defined as "the state of being unmarried,
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a title, such as Mr., Mrs., Ms., or Miss, the application form shall state
conspicuously that the designation of.such title is optional. Except for
this designation of title, if used in an application form the remainder
of the application form shall otherwise use only terms that are neutral
as to sex.48
The revised version of Regulation B injects a new concept into the
evaluation of credit applications. This method of evaluating creditworthiness of the applicant has been called an "effects test" concept and
is referred to in footnote seven of the regulation:
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the Congress intended an "effects test" concept, as outlined in the employment field
by the Supreme Court in the cases of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975), to be applicable to a creditor's determination of creditworthiness.4
The regulation does not specify the details in which such a test can be
specifically applied in determining an applicant's creditworthiness. 50
Revised Regulation B specifically defines the adverse action of a
creditor in regard to a credit application which triggers the requirement
by that creditor to give to the applicant a notice of the creditor's adverse action on the application." The revised regulation also contains
model credit application forms, which, if used by the creditor, shall be
deemed to be in compliance with the pertinent provisions of the regulation. These model application forms are designated as Appendix B to
Regulation B.
REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES

AcT

The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 52 (RESPA) was passed
to ensure that consumers are provided with more information on the
nature and costs of the settlement process involved in real estate transactions. The Act also seeks to protect consumers from unnecessarily
high settlement charges caused by certain abusive practices that have
married or separated, as defined by applicable State law ....
includes a person who is divorced or widowed."
48. Id. § 202.6(d)(3).
49. Id. § 202.6(a)n.7.
50. Id. § 202.6(a).
51. Id. §H202.2(c), 202.9.

mhe term 'unmarried'

Id. § 202.2(u).

52. Act of Dec. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified at 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2617 (Supp. 1976 & Pamp. Supp. 1 1976)). The Act is supplemented
by Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.1-.14 (1977), which is prepared by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
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RESPA requires that more

effective advance disclosures of settlement costs be made to the consumer and the seller during the settlement process for residential real
estate transactions." Kickbacks or referral fees that unnecessarily
increase certain settlement services are eliminated by the Act.

Fur-

ther, the amounts consumers are required to place in escrow accounts
established to ensure payment of real estate taxes and insurance were

reduced.55 RESPA additionally provides for initial reform and modernization of local record keeping of land title information. 6
Any lender making a federally related mortgage loan is required to
disclose to the consumer, the seller, and to the appropriate federal
agency proposing to ensure or guarantee the loan a written itemized
57
disclosure of each charge arising in connection with the settlement.
The lender must disclose the settlement costs on a standard form pre-

pared by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. The form
conspicuously and clearly itemizes all charges imposed upon the consumer and the seller in connection with the settlement.58 Lenders

must also distribute special information booklets concerning the costs
of real estate settlement services to each person submitting an applica-

tion to borrow money for the purchase of residential real estate.59
In prohibiting kickbacks and fees other than for services actually performed in a transaction, the Act provides for criminal penalties,
including a fine up to a maximum of ten thousand dollars or one year
imprisonment or both for any person accepting or giving any unearned
fee. 60 In addition to the imposition of the criminal penalty, RESPA
53. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (Supp. V 1975).
54. Id. § 2601(b)(1). RESPA applies to a residential real estate transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan which is secured by residential real estate (including condominiums and cooperatives) designed principally for the occupancy of from one
to four families. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2602(1)(A) (Pamp. Supp. 1 1976).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2), (3) (Supp. V 1975). A seller of property covered
by the Act also cannot require as a condition of sale that a consumer purchase title
insurance covering the property from a particular title company. Id. § 2608(a). A
seller who violates this provision shall be liable to the consumer in an amount equal
to three times all charges made for such title insurance. Id. § 2608(b).
56. Id.§ 2601(b)(4).
57. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2603(a) (Pamp. Supp. 1 1976).
58. Id. The standard form should also disclose all of the settlement costs and services "including, but not limited to title searches, title examinations, the provision of title
certificates, title insurance, services rendered by an attorney, the preparation of documents, property surveys, the rendering of credit reports or appraisals, pest and fungus
inspections, services rendered by a real estate agent or broker, the handling of the processing, and closing or settlement. . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 2602(3) (Supp. V 1975).
59. 12 U.S.C.A. 2604 (Supp. 1976 & Pamp. Supp. I 1976).
60. Id. § 2607.
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provides for recovery of civil penalties amounting to treble damages,
plus court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 6 '
In an action to recover damages pursuant to RESPA's provisions, suit
may be brought in any district court of the United States or any other
court of competent jurisdiction.6 2 Such an action, however, must be
brought within one year from the date the violation occurred.,
RESPA specifically provides, however, that none of its provisions affect
the validity or enforceability of any sale, contract for sale, or any mort64
gage or lien perfected on property'involved in a real estate transaction.
THE HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE

Acr OF 1976

The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act65 requires certain depository
institutions to publicly disclose information concerning residential and
home improvement loans which those institutions make in certain geographical areas."6 Disclosure of this information is designed to enable citizens and public officials to determine whether the depository
institutions are fulfilling their obligations in serving the housing needs
of the communities and neighborhoods in which they are located.6 7
The Office of Management and Budget is required by this Act to
define standard metropolitan statistical areas in urban zones throughout
the United States."' Each depository institution which, as of its last full
fiscal year, has total assets of ten million dollars and which has a home
or a branch office located in a standard metropolitan statistical area
must disclose the number and total dollar amount of loans that were
originated or purchased by the institution during the preceding fiscal
year. The number and dollar amount of home improvement loans
made by a depository institution covered by the Act must also be designated. 69 This information must be retained and made available to the
61. Id. § 2607.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (Supp. V 1975).

63. Id. § 2615.

64. Id. § 2615.
65. Id. §§ 2801-2809. The Act is supplemented by Regulation C, prepared by the
Federal Reserve Board, 12 C.F.R. § 203 (1976).
66. "Depository institutions" are defined as "any commercial bank, savings bank,
savings and loan association, building and loan association or homestead association...
or credit union which makes federally related mortgage loans." Id. § 2802(2).
67. Id. § 2801.
68. Id. § 2803.
69. Id. § 2803(a)(2). Depositories must designate the number and dollar amount
of each loan which is secured by property located outside of the standard metropolitan
statistical area. In addition, the number and dollar amount of loans which are insured
by federal agencies and the number and dollar amount of mortgage loans made to mort-
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public for a period of five years after the close of the first year during
which the information is required.7"
SIGNIFICANT RECENT CASE REVISIONS

BY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

An analysis of the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit is indicative of the emergence of consumer credit
law in the United States. Although the Truth-in-Lending Act became
effective in 1969, the Fifth Circuit did not decide its first consumer
credit case until September 1971. The Fifth Circuit decided only two
consumer cases in 1972 and one in 1973. The pendulum then began
to swing in earnest with four consumer credit decisions in 1974 and
three in 1975. The Fifth Circuit wrote fifteen consumer credit decisions
in 1976, and each advance sheet further evinces the river of consumer
litigation that began as a trickle five short years ago.
The Fifth Circuit decisions reflect the increasing trend toward
consumer protection. The initial consumer credit decision by the Fifth
Circuit was Mourning v. Family PublicationsService, Inc.71 The Fifth
Circuit began its analysis of consumer credit law on the side of the
creditor by holding unconstitutional the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation Z, which applied TIL disclosure requirements to finance
charge-free consumer loans payable in more than four installments.72
The court held in Mourning that in order for the Truth-in-Lending Act
to apply there must be three elements-a creditor, a consumer credit
transaction, and a finance charge.7" The Fifth Circuit held the Truthin-Lending Act was penal and thus must be strictly construed. 74 By
controlling loans which had no finance charge, Regulation Z constituted an administrative enlargement of the law and was therefore
unconstitutional.75
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the Fifth
Circuit's narrow creditor-oriented approach to Truth-in-Lending.
gators who did not intend to reside in the property securing the mortgage loan must be

disclosed. id. § 2803(a) (2).
70. Id. § 2803(c). The data must be first gathered for the fiscal year beginning
with the last fiscal year of the institution which immediately preceded the effective date
of the Act. id.§ 2803(a)(2).
71. 449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
72. Id. at 242-43.
73. id. at 240.
74. Id. at 240.
75. Id. at 241.
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Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger observed that Congress
created a broad structure for the Truth-in-Lending Act and entrusted
the Federal Reserve Board with the duty of implementing and monitoring the Act's operation.7" The court held Regulation Z was within
the authority granted the Federal Reserve Board by Congress.77
While Mourning was pending in the Supreme Court, the Fifth
Circuit decided two more consumer credit cases. In the first case,
Wilson v. Retail Credit Co.,78 the court held the Fair Credit Reporting
Act was not retroactive and therefore did not apply to statements made
prior to its enactment.7 9 Sosa v. Fite,80 the second decision, was the
first of two opinions in a landmark case involving the right of rescission.
Initially, the trial court decided that either the exemption for state-regulated transactions, or a lack of jurisdiction compelled dismissal.8" The
Fifth Circuit disagreed and held the Federal Reserve Board was the
only power that could grant state-regulated exemptions and therefore
the exemption argument was inapplicable.8 2 The Fifth Circuit decided
the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 and remanded
the case for a determination on its merits.8"
On remand, the trial court allowed the plaintiff to rescind her home
improvement contract with the defendant-creditor but awarded judgment to the defendant for the balance owing on the contract. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the contract's rescission, but reversed the award
to the defendant for the balance owing on the contract.8 4 The plaintiff
had timely exercised her right of rescission by giving the contractor notice
of rescission prior to three days after delivery of the statutorily prescribed disclosures.8 Since the contractor did not respond to the plaintiff's rescission notice, the court held the plaintiff fulfilled her rescission
obligations by the mere offer to return the goods. The plaintiff, therefore, had no obligation to the defendant for further payments and was
76. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 365 (1973).
77. Id. at 371.
78. 457 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972).
79. Id. at 1407.
80. 465 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1972).
81. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1633, 1640 (1974 & Supp. 1976). See generally McDaniel
v. University of Chicago, 512 F.2d 583, vacated, 423 U.S. 810 (1975); Finnerty v.
Cowen, 508 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1974).
82. Sosa v. Fite, 465 F.2d 1227, 1228-29 (5th Cir. 1972).
83. Id. at 1229.
84. Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 118-19; see Ljepava v. M.L.S.C. Properties, Inc., 511 F.2d 935, 944 (9th
Cir. 1975); Powers v. Sims & Levin Realtors, 396 F. Supp. 12, 26 (E.D. Va. 1975).
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entitled to full restitution of all amounts previously paid to the contractor and a release of the judgment lien. 6
In 1973 the Fifth Circuit reviewed the application of Truth-in-Lending to open end credit in Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co.8 7

The court held that open end credit accounts must comply with existing
disclosure requirements regardless of the age of the accounts."8 Minimum damages for each violative periodic statement were awarded by
the court's holding that each statement was a separate violation."
In Bussey v. Georgia Bankamericard0 a special master, the trial

court, and the Fifth Circuit panel unanimously agreed that a credit card
issuer had made the necessary statutorily-required disclosures. 91 Repeating the established purpose of the Truth-in-Lending Act of
meaningful disclosure, the court held the use of "periodic finance
charge," "cash advance finance charge," and "total finance charge" as
disclosure terms complied with the required disclosure terms "finance
charge" and "periodic rate" used in the Act. 92 In addition, the court
extended its common sense approach by holding that the use of an
arithmetic disclosure sequence was meaningful. 9"
Bankamericard used different color backgrounds to emphasize not
only the finance charge and the annual percentage rate, but also the
itemized portions of the finance charge. Although the itemized portions were included, the court held Bankamericard still complied with
its duty to conspicuously disclose the finance charge. 4
After the Sosa decision, the Fifth Circuit, in Philbeck v. Timmers
Chevrolet, Inc., 5 addressed the use of credit life insurance in an automobile installment loan contract. Timmers clearly disclosed that the
purchase of credit life insurance was optional and that the existence
of credit life insurance was not a factor in the extension of credit. 96
86. Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1974); accord, Strader v. Beneficial
Fin. Co., 551 P.2d 720, 725-26 (Colo. 1976).
87. 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973).
88. Id. at 745.
89. Id. at 747.
90. 516 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1975).
91. Id. at 456.
92. Id. at 456-57.
93. Id. at 456-57.
94. Id. at 457. But see Zeltzer v. Carte Blanche Corp., 514 F.2d 1156, 1163 (3d
Cir. 1975).
95. 499 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974).
96. Id. at 978-81. The court also noted that the TIL was designed to ensure mean-

ingful disclosure of credit provisions so that consumers can intelligently choose credit
plans.
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Since the term of the insurance was the same as the contract's term,
disclosure of the insurance's term was unnecessary, and therefore,
Timmers did not have to include the cost of credit life insurance as part
97
of the finance charge.
The Fifth Circuit began 1975 with another case concerning a home
improvement contract, Sellers v. Wollman.9 8 Since the Sellers trial
court did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law, the Fifth Circuit held it could not review the merits of the case. 9 Remanding the
case, the court observed that contrary to the holding of Bostwick v.
Cohen, 10 0 a court may allow both the remedy of rescission and a recovery of damages. 1"' In addition, the court observed that the award
of attorneys' fees was not dependent upon the plaintiff's obligation to
10 2
pay a fee.
Burton v. G.A.C. Finance Co.'0 3 was the first consumer credit case
for the Fifth Circuit in 1976. The court vacated and remanded the
trial court's decision for the creditor because of procedural mistakes
which made the trial court's in camera decision improper. 104 The court
adopted a narrow construction approach contrary to the common
sense approach of Bussey. 0 5 The finance company's contract stated:
"[T]he cost of such insurance(s) may be obtained by borrower through
any person of his choice, however, the lender reserves the right to refuse, for reasonable cause, to accept an insurer offered by the customer."' 06 The court held this disclosure did not advise the customer
of his right to purchase the insurance from the person of his choice.' 7
In so observing, the Fifth Circuit created an internal contradiction as
to whether a creditor must comply explicitly and precisely with the
Truth-in-Lending Act or whether a meaningful, substantial compliance
is sufficient.
97. Id. at 981; accord, Doggett v. Ritter Fin. Co., 528 F.2d 860, 863 (4th Cir.
1975).
98. 510 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1975).
99. Id. at 121-22.
100. 319 F.Supp. 875, 878 (N.D.Ohio 1970).
101. Sellers v.Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1975). See also White v.Arlen
Realty & Dev. Corp., 540 F.2d 645, 648 (4th Cir. 1975); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1635, 1640
(Supp. 1976).
102. Sellers v.Wollman,510 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1975); see Martin v.Body, 533
S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tex.Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ) (reasonableness of attorneys' fees must be shown).
103. 525 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1976).
104. Id. at 963-64.
105. Id. at 964-65 (dicta).
106. Id. at 964.
107. Id. at 964-65.
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Ten days later, the court faced its first attempt at a consumer class
action in Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co.'0 Mr. Pennino, a retail
charge account customer of Kirschman, alleged the retailer had violated
the Truth-in-Lending Act in its periodic statements to customers. The
court followed the same strict interpretation approach as Burton and
held that technical violations of the TIL were sufficient to invoke the
Act's penalty provisions. 10 9 The court strictly interpreted the bona fide
error defense as being inapplicable unless the error was made in reliance
on a "rule, regulation or interpretation" of the Federal Reserve Board. 10
The retailer had additionally violated the Truth-in-Lending Act in a
number of ways, such as the failure to use the term "new balance,"
the failure to clearly disclose the "billing date," and an inadequate disclosure of the security interest granted in purchased merchandise."'
Upon finding these violations, the court directed the trial court to consider the question of a class action. 112 The court stressed that the retailer must make clear, meaningful disclosures so the consumer does
not have to assume, surmise, or guess as to his credit status."'
Six days later, a consumer again prevailed in Williams v. United
Credit Plan, Inc.,1 4 the third such decision in a little over two weeks.
Williams sued both the lender and contractor for rescission of a home
improvement contract and for damages. The Fifth Circuit reversed a
trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, stating that the plaintiff's failure to specify the alleged violations of the Truth-in-Lending
Act was insufficient cause for dismissal. 115 Parties should instead use
other procedural devices, such as a motion for more definite statement,
in order to narrow the issues." 6 An allegation of a loan execution,
108. 526 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1976).
109. Id. at 370. See also Hinkle v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 295, 297
(10th Cir. 1976).
110. Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 526 F.2d 367, 370 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976).
Federal Reserve Board regulations provide a defense where failure to comply results
from a mechanical, electrical, or clerical error made in good faith. 12 C.F.R. § 202.11
(a) (1976). Here, the defendant removed the finance charge from the plaintiff's account with the simple explanation that it had been made "through inadvertence." 526
F.2d at 370 n.5.
111. Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 526 F.2d 367, 370-72 (5th Cir. 1976).
112. Id. at 372.
113. Id. at 372.
114. 526 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1976).
115. Id. at 714-15. See also Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86,
91-92 (8th Cir. 1976)(third-party financer intimately involved in credit transactions
may become liable as an extender of credit for failure to make proper disclosures). But
see Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 533 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 153 (1976), noted p. 853 infra.
116. Williams v. United Credit Plan, Inc., 526 F.2d 713, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1976).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol8/iss4/5

16

Smyer and O'Gorman: Significant Recent Developments in Federal Consumer Credit Legisl

1977]

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER LA W

the parties' identity, and the subcontractor's threat to take legal action
7
against the borrower were sufficient to state a cause of action."1
Two days later, the consumers extended their winning streak in
Jones v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp.'1 8 Jones involved the question
of whether statutory loan fees imposed pursuant to Georgia law were
required to be disclosed as "prepaid finance charges." Since loan fees
were fully earned at the loan's execution, Regulation Z required their
119
disclosure as "prepaid."
After the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Federal Reserve Board advised
the defendants that the interpretative regulation' 2" was intended to
effect a contrary result. The Fifth Circuit granted the defendants' petitions for rehearing and reviewed their holding.
The Jones case was a consolidated appeal of three similar cases, two
of which were distinguished upon rehearing. Affirming its first
opinion, the court held that the loans in two cases were made prior
to the Federal Reserve Board's regulation and therefore the regulation was immaterial and the fees should have been disclosed.' 2 '
The third loan was made after the regulation's amendment. The
Fifth Circuit examined the Federal Reserve Board's position and found
that the loan fee must always be part of the "finance charge."' 2 2 The
court observed that the Federal Reserve Board's limitation on the concept of "prepaid finance charge" would render meaningless the requirement of disclosure of such charges."' In addition, the court expressed its view that the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation was
meaningless and contrary to the statutory scheme. 124 The Fifth
Circuit, however, recognized the statutory exemption from liability
where the lender acted in reliance on the Federal Reserve Board's
regulation.' 25 The court limited its analysis to the regulation itself by
holding that staff letters issued prior to all three loans could not affect
the merits of a section 1640(f) defense.' 26 As a result of its holding,
117. Id. at 714.
118. 526 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1976).
119. Id. at 643. It is interesting to note that all of the consumer victories came as
a result of the Fifth Circuit's overturning trial court, creditor-oriented decisions.
120. 12 C.F.R. § 226.819 (1976).
121. Jones v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 544 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1976)
(on rehearing).
122. Id. at 1231.
123. Id. at 1231.
124. Id. at 1232.
125. Id. at 1231-32. The statutory exemption is found in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(f)
(Pamp. Supp. 11 1976).
126. Jones v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 544 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1976).
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the court remanded the third case to determine if the lender had in
fact acted in reliance on the Federal Reserve Board Regulation. 2 7 By
its reversal of the regulation, the court eliminated the possibility of using
a section 1640(f) defense for any loan made after its decision which
failed to disclose the loan fees as "prepaid."
The Fifth Circuit's dismissal of Federal Reserve Board staff letters
as "not rules, regulations, or interpretations" and therefore immaterial
for purposes of a section 1640(f) defense severely limits the value of
the staff letters. 2 ' The effect of this interpretation is to place on the
lender the burden of obtaining official Board interpretations before
commencing a course of action.
In Weaver v. General Finance Corp.,'12 a per curiam opinion, the
court held a creditor's contract violated TEL when it stated the amount
financed would be reduced by the amount of the insurance charges.'
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the provision was misleading to the consumer and confused the real identity of the amount
financed, including the insurance charges not contained in the finance
81
charge.'
Consumer victories continued with Pollock v. General Finance

Corp.' $2 Implementing the strict interpretation approach, the Fifth
Circuit held a creditor must disclose the amount of cash given a debtor,
individually itemized charges, and the total of the two in an installment
cash loan. 8 8 Although Pollock could have determined these figures
by applying simple arithmetic to the disclosed figures, the court held
the contract in question violated the Truth-in-Lending Act.'
The
lender's security interest disclosure was also insufficient because it failed
to explain the ten day limitation of subsection 9-204(2) of the Uniform
Commercial Code. 18
A third violation was committed where the
lender used conditional language in one document regarding a security
127. Id. at 1232.
128. Id. at 1232.
129. 528 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1976).
130. Id. at 590.
131. Id. at 590.
132. 535 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976).
133. Id. at 298.
134. Id. at 299.
135. Id. at 299. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) provides:
No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to consumer
goods other than accessions . . . when given as additional security unless the
debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives value.
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interest in after-acquired property and mandatory language in another
disclosure.'
The next consumer credit case, Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber

Co.,' 3 1created a conflict with the previous opinion in Thomas v. MyersDickson Furniture Co."38 In Turner the court found that Firestone's
periodic statements violated the Truth-in-Lending Act by failing to disclose the cost of credit life insurance and by failing to include the cost
in the finance charge on each statement. 89 The court refused to
accept the bona fide error defense because Firestone failed to provide
factual evidence that the omission was a factual mistake and more importantly, that Firestone had made the mistake despite established
"procedures reasonably adopted to avoid such error."' 4 °
Turner was a Pyrrhic victory for the consumer because his recovery
was limited to the minimum statutory award of one hundred dollars.
The court expressly held that a subsequent amendment of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act legislatively reversed the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Thomas.'4 ' As a result, the consumer could recover only once on
his account even though the creditor sent numerous 142periodic statements, each of which violated the Truth-in-Lending Act.
The Fifth Circuit returned to the examination of installment automobile loans in Grant v. Imperial Motors. 4 '

Emphasizing again its strict

analysis approach, the court expressly stated that the imposition of
statutory penalties was not discretionary regardless of the technicality
of the violation.' 44 The court held that one of the defendant car dealers violated the law when it failed to itemize and disclose the license,
title, and registration fees chargeable in the transaction
even though the
14
amount.
and
scope
violation was miniscule in its
The Grant court also held that the failure to fill in a blank with the
46
figure zero was not a per se violation since the figure was surplusage.
In addition, the creditor need not disclose the right of acceleration since
136. Pollack v. General Fin. Corp., 535 F.2d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1976).
137. 537 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1976).
138. 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973).
See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
139. Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 537 F.2d 1296, 1297-98 (5th Cir. 1976).
140. Id. at 1298.
141. Id. at 1298-99; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(g) (Supp. 1976).
142. Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 537 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1976).
143. 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1976).
144. Id. at 510.
145. Id. at 510; accord, Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511 (5th
Cir. 1976).
146. Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506, 510 (5th Cir. 1976).
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it was not a "default, delinquency or similar charge."' 47 Further, no
disclosure was necessary to explain the "sum-of-digits" method in using
that term to disclose the manner of figuring prepayment of a loan. 1 48
The Grant court approved the defendants' disclosure of a security
interest which stated that "[h]older retains a security title to and a security interest in property until total of payments and any other indebtedness now or hereafter due or owing by Buyer to Holder, however
and whenever incurred, is paid.' 4 9
In Meyers v. Clearview Dodge, 5 0 a case factually similar to Grant,
the Fifth Circuit uniquely analyzed the seller-assignee relationship.
Judge Lynne, a District Judge sitting by designation, wrote the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in both Grant and Meyers. In Meyers Judge Lynne
observed that since the automobile dealer did not finance sales itself,
but prearranged assignment of its buyers' contracts, the assignee-creditor
was a "creditor" under the Truth-in-Lending Act and could not invoke
the limited protection of a "subsequent assignee."''
Judge Lynne
added that the two defendants were jointly responsible for making
disclosures, but they were jointly and severally liable for only one
statutory penalty.' 52 The court also held the creditor's assignment of
proceeds to a reserve account for the seller's benefit did not constitute
a "finders fee" required to be disclosed.' 5
In Martin v. Commercial Securities Co. 5 4 the Fifth Circuit rejected
several lower court decisions and a Federal Reserve Board Staff
Opinion Letter and held failure to disclose an acceleration clause and
rebate policy in an installment credit transaction was not actionable.' 55
Murray v. Amoco Oil Co.15 6 involved a consumer's suit against
Amoco alleging a violation of the Consumer Credit Protection Act for
147. Id. at 508.
148. Id. at 509.
149. Id. at 508.
150. 539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1976).
151. Id. at 514-15.
152. Id. at 515, 520-21.
153. Id. at 516-17.
154. 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976).
155. Id. at 528-29; accord, Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511, 519
(5th Cir. 1976); Grant v. Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1976). These
holdings were reasserted in three per curiam opinions: McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank,
543 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1976); Whittlesey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 542 F.2d 245, 246
(5th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1976).
Contra, Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 267-68 (3d Cir.
1975).
156. 539 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1976).
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failure to send the consumer periodic statements regarding his open
end credit account. Mr. Murray also alleged that Amoco had libeled
him by referring his account to a collection agency. In an appeal from
the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the Fifth Circuit reversed
that court's decision. Taking a narrow view of the record, the Fifth
Circuit limited its holding by saying that the dismissal was premature
because the allegations stated on the face of Murray's complaint must
be taken as true. 1 57 Amoco argued that under the implementing regulation158 they were relieved of the duty to send periodic statements because delinquency collection procedures had commenced. 9 The
court held Amoco's position to be premature and one which should be
developed during the subsequent trial. The court avoided a decision
on the libel claim saying that the record was insufficent to allow a
review of the claim on the merits, but instructed the district court to
determine the propriety of exercising pendent jurisdiction over the libel
claim. 160
The disclosure problems of consolidation or renewal loans were the
subject of the Fifth Circuit's decision in McGowan v. Credit Center,
Inc.161 The court held that allocation of loan proceeds to pay prior
debts was not part of the finance charge nor the cost of the loan at
issue. Therefore, the amount of the prior loans and the amount of the
retired debt were not required disclosures. 62 Nevertheless, since the loan
occurred prior to an amendatory interpretative regulation on prepaid
finance charges, the lender's failure to include a broker's fee as part
of the prepaid finance charge rendered the lender liable under the
Truth-in-Lending Act.'
CONCLUSION

While the future is always uncertain, the Fifth Circuit's consumer
credit decisions evince certain trends. The number of consumer
credit decisions is increasing, indicating a growing awareness of consumer credit law. The concentration of activity in Louisiana and Georgia continues to identify these two states as the center of Truth-in157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 1387.
12 C.F.R. 226.7(b)(1) (1976).
Murray v. Amoco Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1385, 1387 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1388.
546 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 76.
Id. at 76-77.
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Lending activity in the Fifth Circuit. The most significant trend is the
increasing orientation of the Fifth Circuit in favor of the consumer. All
of these trends may continue, but regardless of their viability, consumer
credit law has come of age in the Fifth Circuit.
The legislation summarized in this article is only a part of the body
of consumer law which has been passed recently by the United States
Congress. The trend toward legislative consumer protection is expanding at such a rapid rate that Congress has empowered the Federal
Trade Commission, and various other administrative agencies, with
unprecedented authority to dictate by administrative decree various
rules and regulations which bind the commercial community as well as
creditors and sellers who deal directly with the consumer.1 4 Although
some of the reforms pronounced in these administrative regulations and
rulings have been necessary to provide adequate protection to the consumer in an expanding economy, the administrative agencies must learn
to assert their new found rule-making power with caution and responsibility lest they regulate this area of our private enterprise system to
such a degree that the benefits achieved by the recent consumer reform
are totally lost.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. V 1975).
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